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Abstract 
The main purpose of this paper is to formalise the modelling process, analysis and mathematical definition of 
corruption when entering into a contract between principal agent and producers. The formulation of the 
problem and the definition of concepts for the general case are considered. For definiteness, all calculations 
and formulas are given for the case of three producers, one principal agent and one intermediary. Economic 
analysis of corruption allowed building a mathematical model of interaction between agents. Financial 
resources distribution problem in a contract with a corrupted intermediary is considered. Then proposed 
conditions for corruption emergence and its possible consequences. Optimal non-corruption schemes of 
financial resources distribution in a contract are formed, when principal agent`s choice is limited first only by 
asymmetrical information and then also by external influences. Numerical examples suggesting optimal 
corruption-free agents’ behaviour are presented. 
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays problem of corruption gets a lot of attention in both scientific and political 
spheres. The reason for such interest is due to harmful effects it has on society and economy. 
Corruption undermines the functioning of the host state and lowers the efficiency of production 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1999). It also hampers economic development and growth, especially since it has 
negative impact on investment rates (Wei and Wu, 2001). Corruption is most commonly defined as 
the misuse or the abuse of public office for private gain (World Bank, 1997). Recent studies are 
focusing more and more on specific anti-corruption programmes based on countries' experiences. A 
numerous research is coming from developing countries describing current economy situation and 
proposing anti-corruption measures.  
 The president of Russian Federation has set a very important task for Russia to enter into the 
top twenty countries in the «Ease of doing business» ranking provided by the World Bank. A high 
ease of doing business ranking means the regulatory environment is more conducive to the starting 
and operation of a local firm. Empirical research funded by the World Bank to justify their work 
shows that the effect of improving these regulations on economic growth is strong (World Bank, 
2013). 
National anti-corruption committee ran by Kirill Kabanov is conducting a research for 
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Kremlin on corruption strategies used in Russia and other countries. As a result of this analysis, the 
head of the National anti-corruption committee will propose to include additional legal mechanism 
for fighting against corruption.  
National Anti-Corruption Strategy was introduced in Russia in 2010, but there are some 
questions raised about its efficiency. Due to the fact that currently in Russia there is no thorough 
analysis of corruption practices and no thorough analysis of anti-corruption mechanisms, running 
anti-corruption plan does not prove to be effective.  
The purpose of the conducted research, the results of which are presented in this paper, is to 
formalise the modelling process, analysis and mathematical definition of corruption when entering 
into a contract and to find optimal strategies for a corruption-free interaction between principal 
agent and producers. 
 
 
2. Mathematical model of corruption-free interaction between principal 
agent and producers 
 
Consider a model },,{= HI  , where principal agent 0F  enters into a contract with 
producers iF , in order to produce iq  amount of goods for is amount of money 
(here and below )i I . During the life of the contract the prodcuers iF  might face decrease (or 
increase) in the production levels  , depending on the amount of funds delivered by the principal 
agent. 
The principal agent 0F  can contact an intermediary F  in order to get information about the 
change in the level of production  . 
In case there is an increase in production level f , the producer can spend less money than 
the amount of funds provided by the principal agent 0F , and thus gain additional profit. The 
producer iF  wants to conceal this information, and hence he/she offers a bribe iz  to the 
intermediary F . In this model we consider a case of a corrupted intermediary. If there is a decrease 
in the production level d , then the provided funds are not enough to sustain production level, and 
hence the producer wants the official report to contain true information, and thus, he/she is required 
to offer bribe iz  to the intermediary F , as the intermediary threatens to hide this information. If the 
intermediary F  is not aware of the above, he/she does not tend to conceal any information.  
In order to stop intermediary F  and the producer iF  from negotiating between themselves, 
the principal agent  0F  can  make a legal payment S  to the intemediary F . In this case the 
intermediary presents true information in the report R . 
Then the principal agent makes a decision about funds distribution 
isS =  between the 
producers iF  based on the intermediary's  F  report R . 
 
2.1 Formalisation of the corruption model   when entering into a contract 
 
 Consider a model with three producers. The producers 1F , 2F  and 3F together account for 
the following amount of goods  
 1 2 3= .Q q q q   
 
 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3= , = , = ,q e q e q e    (1) 
 where 1 2 3, ,q q q  - the amount of goods produced by the producers 1F , 2F  and 3F  respectively, 
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1 2 3, ,e e e R  - the efforts made by the producers 
1F , 2F  and 3F , and 
 , , 0 < < , =1,2,3i i i i if d d f i      - is the change in the level of production, which is a private 
information held by the producers.   
The payoff of the producers is defined by the formula:  
 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
1 2 3= ( ) , = ( ) , = ( ) ,F F F
H s e z H s e z H s e z         (2) 
 where , =1,2,3is i  - is the size of financial funding provided by the principal agent 0F . The amount 
of funding spent by iF  on the production of goods is described by the function )(ei ; 0>))(( ei  
and 0))(( ei  for =1,2,3i . The side payment 0iz  is offered by the producer iF  to the 
intermediary F . 
The payoff function of the intermediary F  is as follows:  
 1 2 3= (1 )( ),
F
H S z z z     
where 0S  --- is the financial funding provided by the principal agent, 1 2 3( ) > 0z z z    --- are 
the costs for the intermediary to conceal side payments done by the producers iF . 
The intermediary F  examines and analyses the information about the producers 1F , 2F  
and 3F and either finds out about the change in the production level ( { , }, =1,2,3
i i i
f d i   ) with 
probability i , or he/she does not find out anything ( =i ), i=1,2,3 with probability )(1 i . In 
case the intermediary F  finds out the true situation about the production level, he/she can eaither 
specify this information in the report for the principal agent, or conceal it. The report sent to the 
principal agent 0F  by the intermediary F  is denoted as 
1 2 3= ( , , )R r r r   
 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3
1 3 1 3 1 3
{( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , ),
( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , ),
( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , ),
( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , ), (
f f f f f d f d f f d d
d f f d f d d d f d d d
f f f d d f d d
f f f d d f
R            
           
       
     

   
   1 3
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
2 2 1 1
3 3
, , ),
( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , ),
( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , ),
( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , )}
d d
f f d f f d d d
f d f d
f d
 
       
   
 

   
       
      
 (3) 
 
The probabilities , =1,2,3ip i  of the change in the production level being positive, together 
with probabilities i  of the intermediary F  learning the information, define 32  states. 
The payoff function of the principal agent is defined as follows:  
  ,)(=
0
STQMHF   (4) 
 where Q  - is the amount of produced goods, T  -  are funds given to the producers 1F , 2F  and 
3F , and S  --- are funds given to the intermediary F , M is mathematical expectation. 
The principal agent 0F  can not observe 
i , or , =1,2,3i i . He/she receives the report from 
the intermediaryR  about the state of the companies-producers 1F , 2F  and 3F  and only after finds 
out about the amount of produced goods 1q , 2q  and 3q . 
The principal agent 0F  simultaneously offers a contract to the producers 
1F , 2F  and 3F  and 
the intermediary F , in which the following is stipulated: the transmitted financial funds to the 
producers as a function of realised production and possibly the report, and the transmitted financial 
funds to the intermediary as a function of the report.   
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2.2 The construction of optimal funds distribution schemes with no 
corruption when entering into a contract. 
  
2.2.1 The problem of funds distribution when entering into a contract 
under conditions of information asymmetry with no intermediary 
 
 Four states exist for each producer iF : 
}=,={:1 if
i
f
i  , }=,={:2 id
i
d
i  , }=,={:3  if
i , 
}=,={:4  id
i , =1,2,3i . 
Consider the problem of funds distribution under condtion that there is no intermediary 
involved as a nucleus of model  . Define this situation in terms of the main model   with 0=i .  
It follows that only the following states exist 
 1 2 3 1 2 313 16:{ = ( , , ), = ( , , )},         (5) 
where }{},,{  idf
i  , for =1,2,3i  
The remaining states (1-12) have the probability of 0. The producers (but not the principal 
agent) observe the true change in the level of production before taking a decision on the efforts 
needed. By using (1), (2) and (4) the function of the principal agent can be written as   
 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
0
= ( ) ( ) ( ) .F F F FH M e e H e e H e e H                (6) 
 The delivery contract between the principal agent and producers is defined by the set 
1 2 31 2 3( ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ))F F Fe e e H H H      . The delivery contract should satisfy three types of 
conditions. The condition of rationality, 0, =1,2,3iFMH i  which ensures that producers stay in the 
project. Encouraging conditions (9) are required to make sure that the producers choose the contract 
designed for the real production level  . Finally, the following inequality should be satisfied 
0<
iF
min
iF
j HH   for all =1,2,3i , which excludes the possibility of the producers going bankrupt. 
The principal agent solves the following problem  
 
  ])()[(1])([(max
1
4
1
4
1
4
111
3
1
3
1
3
11
4
,
3
,
4
,
3
F
d
F
f
iFH
iFHieie
HeepHeep   (7) 
 
 
2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 4 4 4[ ( ) ] (1 )[ ( ) ]
F F
f dp e e H p e e H            
 
3 33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 4 4 4[ ( ) ] (1 )[ ( ) ])
F F
f dp e e H p e e H           
 
 
1 1 11 1
3 4
2 2 22 2
3 4
3 3 33 3
3 4
= (1 ) 0,
= (1 ) 0,
= (1 ) 0
F F F
F F F
F F F
MH p H p H
MH p H p H
MH p H p H
  
  
  
 (8) 
 
 4 4 4 3 3 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), =1,2,3
ii
i i fi i F F i id
i i
f d
e e H H e e i

   
 
      (9) 
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3 4, , =1,2,3
i i iF F F
minH H H i  (10) 
where )(= 333 etH
iF   and 4 4 4= ( ), =1,2,3
iFH t e i  are the payoffs gained by the producers when 
they fulfill the contract for the real production level i . In case there is an increase in the 
production level if  , the producer 
iF  is considered to be a favourable producer; and the producer in 
the id  is considered to be an unfavourable type. 
ie3  and 
ie4  are the levels of the efforts, needed to 
produce the target amount of goods in the states 3 and 4 respectively. 
Assuming that 0<
iF
min
iF
j HH   gives the optimum, and under condition that the producers 
can still produce the goods even if there is a decrease in the level of production, the solution 
3 4 3 4( , , , ), =1,2,3
i i i ie e U U i  of the problem (7)-(10) is charcterised by the following formula 
 3 3= ( ) = , =1,2,3
i i i i
f fe e e i    (11) 
where ( ), =1,2,3i if de e i  give the best level of efforts needed to fulfill the production plan 
i
f (
i
d ).  
Moreover, 
 
4 4 4= ( ) ( ) ( ) < , =1,2,3
1
i
i i i i i i
d di
p
e e e e i
p
    

 (12) 
where )( 4
ii e  is defined as  
 4 3 4 4 4( ) = = ( ) ( ), =1,2,3.
i
i ii F F i i d
i
f
e H H e e i

 

    (13) 
The function )( 4
ii e  defines a bonus, which should be offered in case production plan is achieved. 
)( 4
ii e  is increasing with ie4 , 0>)()(=))(( 444 i
f
i
d
i
f
i
diiii eee




  . 
Based on the assumption above, 
iF
min
iF
j HH   is a necessary condition, i.e.  
 4 = , =1,2,3,
i iF F
minH H i  
hence, the expected payoff for the producers 1 2 3, ,F F F   
 4= ( ) 0.
i iF F i i i
minMH H p e    (14) 
 The production plan under favourable conditions is at the optimal level with complete information, 
whereas it is disrupted under unfavourable conditions (it does not reach the required production 
level) 4 <
i i
de e . 
Now define functions useful for further analysis.  
Let  
1 1 2 2 3 31 2 31 2 30 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2= ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
F F F FF F F F F F
opt opt opt optH H e H H H e H H H e H H   be expceted 
payoff of the principal agent who does not know about i , for 1,2=1,= ii . The level of efforts 
needed for the favourable case is fixed 
i
f
i ee =1 , and the expected payoff of the principal agent 
becomes:  
 ])()[(1])([=),,( 2221212
0
1
iFiii
d
iiFi
f
i
f
i
f
iiFiFiiF
opt HeepHeepHHeH    (15) 
 The first option of the best result is expressed as:  
 
3 31 2 31 2 30 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 2 1( ,0,0) ( ,0,0) ( , , ) .
F F F FF F
opt d opt d opt optH e H e H e H H H    (16) 
 Similarly, the second option of the best result is defined (for 0=i ,  = 1,2,3i ),  
 
1 2 31 2 31 2 30 0 0 0
2 2 4 2 4 2 4( , ) ( , ) ( , ),
F F F FF F F
opt opt min opt min opt minH H e H H e H H e H    (17) 
 where  
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  )]([(=),( 44
0
2
i
f
i
f
i
f
iiFiiF
opt eepHeH   (18) 
  
 ][)]()[(1 444
iFiiiii
d
i Hpeep    
 
  
 
2.2.2 Financial resources distribution problem in a contract with a 
corrupted intermediary 
 
This section describes how a principal agent with asymmetrical information can 
increase his/her payoff by utilising information given by a more informed intermediary. 
Consider two scenarios: 1st scenario is a general case, in which a choice of principal 
agent`s resources optimal distribution is limited by only asymmetrical information; 2nd 
scenario is a case, in which principal agent`s choice can also be affected by limitations 
coming from external influence.  
Assume that principal agent does not want the producer to go bankrupt, when the 
producer is facing a decrease in productivity. For example, even though the producer can 
overcome such a decrease, this can lead to the closure of factories or companies. In many 
countries there is a government support for the manufacturers in place. The limitations 
coming from external influence are represented as limitations of possible losses for the 
producer, i.e. he/she should not incur losses in scenarios 1 and 2. This means that one can 
only avoid going bankrupt when the principal agent is informed about the change in the 
productivity level. 
 
2.2.3 Conditions for corruption emergence and its possible consequences 
  
When <1  the intermediary is trying to use the information in order to get bribes. As the 
principal agent 0F  does not possess information , =1,2,3
i i , obtained by the intermediary, the 
corruption can emerge in both states. In the first state the producer has a part of a revenue from the 
intermediary equalling the difference between the revenue of the states 3 and 1: 3 1
i iF FH H . The 
producer  iF  would have liked the intermediary to specify =ir   in the report in order to hide 
his/her profits. The intermediary F  might receive a bribe for concealing this information. In state 2 
the producer has a part of a revenue from the intermediary equalling the difference between the 
revenue of the states 2 and 4. The producer iF  would have liked the intermediary F  to give a fair 
report =i dr  . But the intermediary might threaten to conceal this information by specifying =r   
in the report. If 2 4 > 0
i iF FH H , then there exists a risk of blackmail, i.e. the intermediary might 
demand the bribe for presenting true information in the report. 
These 2 cases of a possible bribe have two significant differences. First difference is that the 
net profit for a coalition in the case of blackmail is negative, whereas the net profit in the case of 
offering a bribe from the producer, is positive. Second difference is that in the case of blackmail 
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there is no influence on the report of the intermediary for the principal agent. This affects the 
revenue of the principal agent, because firstly, demanding the bribe reduces the potential profit of 
the producer and thus, it influences the individual limitation of the producer. Secondly, it creates a 
difference between the contractual and realised utility which can lead to non-fulfilment of the 
boundary condition 0
iFH . 
 
2.2.4 The formation of optimal non-corruption schemes of financial 
resources distribution in a contract, when principal agent`s choice is 
limited by only asymmetrical information 
 
 Consider a problem of drawing up a contract when all parties are free to enter into this 
contract, and when a principal agent is only limited by asymmetrical information, i.e. when the 
principal agent does not observe i  and i , =1,2,3.i  
The first auxiliary result is as follows: 
Lemma 1. Let the illegal procedure of the bargain be described by a non-cooperational 
multi-step game: one party offers a way to share a bribe, and the other party accepts or rejects this 
offer, or puts forward a new offer. Then the principal agent`s decision on how to prevent producer 
from offering a bribe to the intermediary, does not depend on the following: 1) the direction of the 
bribe, i.e. to whom and who offers the bribe, 2) one of the parties makes an unambiguous offer 
<<take-it-or-leave-it>>  or both alternatives are considered. 
The optimal mechanism of drawing up a contract is characterised by the following: 
Proposition 1. Corruption does not exist in the equilibrium state. The principal agent 0F  
offers a legal payment to the intermediary F  to get the report R , which entirely compensates for 
the amount of unrealised bribes. If the choice of the principal agent 0F  is limited by only 
asymmetrical information, then there is no blackmail. 
It is obvious that there is no offer of the bribe from the producer to the intermediary in the 
equilibrium state. This situation exists, because it is cheaper for the principal agent 0F  to make a 
legal payment S  to the intermediary F (positive operational costs), rather than give up the 
information to the producers (or coalition). This also explains why a stimulating method of fighting 
against  corruption always dominates. The result of the blackmail absence is less obvious: it appears 
that the optimal reaction to the bribe given by the producer to the intermediary excludes only a part 
of blackmail. In this paper we would only derive the results shown in Proposition 1. 
With Lemma 1 it is known that the principal agent`s payment S , which prevents the 
producer from offering the bribe, should be at least equal to the amount of money which the 
producer could have offered to the intermediary with deduction of transaction costs. As the profits 
for the producer lead to the costs for the principal agent, we can write the following boundary 
condition in the form of equality, which prevents the producer from offering the bribe:  
 1 3 1= (1 )( ),
i ii F Fs H H   (19) 
 where 3 4 4= ( )
i iF F iH H e  due to the limitation for the producers (13). By substituting 1
is  into the 
principal agent`s program and by using predetermined functions 0 01 2(.), (.)
F F
opt optH H  the following can 
be written  
 
1 2 3
1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 31 1 2 2 3 3, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
2 4 1 2 4 2 4 1 2 4 2 4 1 2 4
=max max max max
F F F F F F F F Fe e H H H e e H H H e e H H H
   
where 
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1 11 10
1 2 1 2 4 4 1
, , , ,
2 4 1 2 4
[ ( , , ) (1 ) ( ( ) )max
i i iF i i F F F F
opt
i i ii i F F Fe e H H H
H e H H p H e H      

 
 
 
2 2 3 32 2 3 3
4 4 1 4 4 1( ( ) ) ( ( ) )
F F F Fp H e H p H e H       

 (20) 
  
 0 2 4 4(1 ) ( , )
iF i i F
optH e H   
 
 0,
iFMH   
 
 0,1 
is  
 
 , =1,..,4.
i iF F
j minH H j   
The program leads to the following first order condition: 2ˆ
ie  which is determined by the equation  
 2 2ˆ ˆ= ( ) = .
i i i i
d de e e    (21) 
 
In this case the optimal planned production volume is not achieved in the state 4, i.e. 
4
ˆ <i ide e . The exact formula which determines 4ˆ
ie  depends on the value of 
iF
minH (see Appendix 1). 
Equilibrium payoffs are 
 
3 4 4 1
4 2
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ= ( )
ˆ ˆ= =
i i i iF F i F F
min
i i iF F F
min
H H e H H
H H H
  
 (22) 
 and  
 1 4 4 1
ˆˆ ˆ= (1 )[( ( )) ] 0.
i ii F i Fs H e H     (23) 
 
The payment 1ˆ
is  - is a function of difference between producer`s payoffs in the states 3 and 
1. In the point of optimality the principal agent offers a contract, in which the losses are shared 
between different states in a way that the difference 3 1( )
i iF FH H  is minimal, and at the same time 
the expected payoffs of the producers are minimal. To achieve this it is required that, independent of 
the intentions of the producers, the payoff in the unfavourable situation, does not depend on the 
report =i idr  , i.e. 2 4
ˆ ˆ= =
i i iF F F
minH H H . Hence the optimal answer, which would prevent the 
producer from offering the bribe, excludes the risk of blackmail. The reason for this is the fact that 
the obligations of the producer are not really limited, and we would have an inequality 
1 3 4 4
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ0 < = ( )
i i iF F F iH H H e  . This means that the threat of offering the bribe by the producer, 
forces the principal agent to make a positive payment, even when he/she is informed. On the other 
hand, if the limitations are not enough to keep the producer at his level of productivity with positive 
profits in the state 1, then the optimal contract would lead to a negative value 1
iFH . 
The optimal contract without corruption can be described by the set of 3 elements dependent 
on the report ( , , ) | :
ii F i i
re H s   
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1 4 1 =
=
4 4 =
[ , , (1 )( ( ) )] |
( , ,0) |
ˆ[ , ( ( )),0],[ , ,0] | .
i i ii F F i F
f min i ir
f
ii F
d min i ir
d
i ii F i i F
f min min ir
e H H e H
e H
e H e e H




  

 (24) 
 
In case when information asymmetry is the only limitation when making a contract, one 
needs to always contact the intermediary, because the principal agent can always ignore the report 
when making a decision. In case when there are expenses needed to cover any side payments 
( > 0 ), the contract made on the basis of the intermediary`s report strictly dominates the direct 
contract.  
 
 
2.2.5 The formation of optimal non-corruption schemes of financial 
resources distribution in a contract, when principal agent`s choice is 
limited by asymmetrical information and external influences 
 
Consider a scenario when in addition to information asymmetry there are also external 
limitations 
iFiF HH 21 ,  influencing the principal agent’s choice. In this situation blackmail becomes a 
serious problem.  
In this case, in contrary to the results obtained from Lemma1, the optimal reaction to the 
blackmail is sensitive to the assumptions of the bargain procedures. The reason for this is the fact 
that legal transfer of finances to the intermediary is not a separate process. In contrary, the legal 
transfer of finances including finances for producers 2 4( )
i iF FH H  determines the joint payoff 
related to id , =1,2,3i . Whether the legal transfer of money has an effect on the decision of the 
intermediary, depends on the way the joint payoff is shared amongst the parties.  
Let assume that the intermediary makes an <<accept or reject>> offer. Then the size of the 
legal funds transfer, which is required to avoid the blackmail, is determined by the mechanism that 
forces the intermediary to conceal information in case the producer  rejects the offer. The situation 
when the intermediary has a full bargaining power, which makes the threat of hiding information 
highly probable, is outside the scope of this paper.  
Let assume on contrary, that the result of the illegal bargain is a joint payoff, related to 
, =1,2,3id i , and it is shared between the parties in a way that all parties receive strictly positive 
sum of money. In this case, the funds transfer required to avoid the blackmail, is a function of sum 
of money of the intermediary. 
Consider a situation where the bargain procedures can be described as an alternative offer 
game with a risk of failure. The  <<failure>>  is equivalent to the contract dependent on =ir  . 
One of the possible interpretations is the one where the principal agent can unilaterally decide not to 
wait for the report, whereas intermediary and brokers are not aware of what drives the principal 
agent`s decision.   
Analysing similar results from bargaining games, we see that the solution is the one from the 
Nash’s problem of bargaining (how to share common cost). The sum of money, which needs to be 
shared is 2 4 2( )
i iF F iH H s  , where 2
is  is a legal funds transfer from the producer to the intermediary 
in the state 2. It is known that solution to the Nash`s problem of bargaining leads to the equal 
sharing of this sum. Hence, the payment 2
is  equal or more than equal to 2 4( )
i iF FH H , confuses the 
intermediary and holds him/her from blackmailing the  broker, because he/she can not receive a 
bigger payoff in the bargaining game. In reality it can be shown that, assuming infinitely small bribe 
10 
 
(which is not considered in the paper), the principal agent can use the presence of expenses to hide 
side payments. If the parties have unequal bargaining powers in the game, then the minimal legal 
funds transfer is enough (almost surely) to avoid the demanding of the bribe, and it is equal to  
 
2 2 4= (1 )[( ).
i ii F Fs H H   (25) 
 The scheme, where the principal agent can prevent blackmail by means of legal funds transfer 
(proportional to the profits of the brokers) to the intermediary, may not be optimal, contrary to the 
case, when the producer is offering the bribe himself/herself.  
The optimal mechanism is characterised by the following principals. 
 Proposition 2. The limitation coming from external influence creates a risk of blackmail. At 
the point of optimum there is no (almost) corruption. The principal agent`s choice of using 
encouragements or excluding the possibility of blackmail depends on the result of illegal bargaining 
game. 
It is obvious, that the absence of bribe from the producer is analogous to the already 
considered case without limitations. Whereas, the result that there is <<almost no>> blackmail is an 
effect coming from the external limitation. The external limitation means that the payoff of the 
producer  in the state 2 must not be negative, 02 
iFH . If the producer pays the demanded bribe in 
the state 2 , then the contract should compensate him/her for this loss, i.e. 2 > 0
iF
contH . Given that   
is slightly more than zero, it appears that paying compensation to the producer creates higher costs, 
than the legal funds transfer or exclusion of the blackmail risk. Here <<almost no>> comes from 
the discontinuity of the intermediary’s marginal payoff at the point where there is no demanding of 
the bribe.  
The proof of Proposition 2 was given by Lambert-Mogiliansky (1996), and full solution to 
the problem was also provided. Here we would provide the results for the case considered above, 
when the bargain’s procedure is  «an alternative offer with a risk of failure». The planning program 
is described as follows  
 
 
1 11 10
1 2 1 2 4 4 1
, , , ,
2 4 1 2 4
[ ( , , ) (1 ) ( ( ) )max
i iF i F F F F
opt
i i ii i F F Fe e H H H
H e H H p H e H      

 
 
 
2 2 3 32 2 3 3
4 4 1 4 4 1( ( ) ) ( ( ) )
F F F Fp H e H p H e H       

 (26) 
  
 0 2 4 4(1 ) ( , )
i iF i F
optH e H   
 
 0
iFMH   
 
 1 2, 0
i iF FH H   
 
 0, 21 
ii ss  
 
 4 , =1,
i iF F
minH H j  
where 1S  and 2S  are determined in (19) and (25) respectively. 
First order condition for 4eˆ : 
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 4 4ˆ ˆ= ( ) ( ) 1 (1 ) ,
1 1
i i ii i
d i
i i
p
e e
p

  

 
     
  
 (27) 
 
It follows that 
4 4
ˆ <i ie e  where 4
ie  is a planned volume for unfavourable type with information 
asymmetry (11). The reason for it is that 
3 4= ( )
i iF F i
minH H e  and 1 4 1
ˆ= (1 )( ( ) )
i ii F i F
mins H e H    
are increasing functions of planned volume of the producers` production when there is a failure in 
the state 4, 
4
ie . The equilibrium payoffs are derived in Lambert-Mogiliansky (1996), where it is also 
shown that  
 
1 2
ˆ ˆ= = 0
i iF FH H  
and  
 3 4
ˆ = ( ).
i iF F i
minH H e  
It is known that producers get strictly positive payoffs, when there is asymmetry of information. But 
external limitation prevents the losses in case of complete information. That is why the limitation of 
rationality, which makes sure producers stay in the deal, is not a binding limitation at the point of 
optimum. That is why the sum of money 3 1( )
i iF FH H  in case of the producer offering the bribe, 
can not be decreased without the increase in the payoff of the producer. Thus, we have 
1 2
ˆ ˆ= = 0
i iF FH H . As a result, it is possible to optimally prevent the blackmail with the help of 
encouragements by offering a payment 2 = (1 )
ii F
mins H   where  
 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )p p          . (28) 
The left part of this expression represents a limiting value of decline in the real payoff of the 
producer in the state 4. The first term in the expression is a marginal decline in the legal transfer of 
funds 1ˆ
is  and second one is a marginal decline in the producer’s payoff with asymmetrical 
information. The right part of the expression is a marginal increase in expenses when excluding 
blackmail, i.e. 2ˆ
is . As function 0
FH  is linear over profits, the marginal net value of the producer’s 
payoff decline in the state 4 is constant, and the principal agent here has a binary choice, i.e. either 
4 =
i iF F
minH H  or 0=4
iFH . If inequality (28) is not satisfied, then the principal agent chooses to 
exclude blackmail by proposing a contract, in which 4 2
ˆ ˆ= = 0
i iF FH H . It follows that 2 = 0
is . 
This result can be generalised to the situations with uneven bargaining power in the 
bargaining game: when finding solution in the Nash bargaining problem, the minimal funds transfer 
required to exclude the blackmail, becomes 2
1
ˆ = (1 )
ii F
mins H

 , where   represents the power of 
the producer in the bargaining game (power of the intermediary is normalised to 1). Similarly, 
inequality (28) becomes  
 
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) ,p p    

       (29) 
 As the power of the producer   in the bargaining problem tends to 0, the right side of the 
expression becomes infinitely large. It means that the method of encouragement becomes very 
wasteful, that is why the principal agent uses a different method. Hence, it is not always optimal for 
the principal agent to prevent blackmail through encouragements, contrary to the case when the 
producer is offering the bribe. The most favourable method really depends on how big the sum of 
money the intermediary can get is. The bigger the sum the intermediary can get, the more expensive 
the method of encouragements is. The boundary (in terms of relative powers in the bargaining 
problem), on which the optimal solution switches from the method of encouragements to the 
method of exclusion (i.e.   is so that (29) is true with equality sign), is a function of model 
12 
 
parameters  . 
The optimal contract (on condition that (29) is satisficed) becomes:  
 
4 =
=
4 4 =
ˆ[ ,0, (1 )( ( ))] |
( ,0, ) |
ˆ ˆ[ , ( ( )),0],[ , ,0] | .
ii F i
f min i ir
f
ii F
d min i ir
d
i ii F i i F
f min min r
e H e
e H
e H e e H




 


 (30) 
 In case when there is a corrupted intermediary in the bargain, and the contract should be satisfying 
external boundary conditions, then the dominance of the contract dependent on the report over a 
direct scheme, is not guaranteed. However, it is quite hard to deduct a sufficient condition of 
dominance with a general form function. Below we consider a numerical example (see Example2), 
in which a contract depending on the report is dominant (following some parameter specifications), 
if producer and intermediary have same bargaining powers in the bargaining problem. If the 
intermediary’s bargaining power in the problem of bargaining is so high, that the principal agent 
prefers to exclude the threat of blackmail, then the usage of a corrupted intermediary is strictly 
dominated.  
 
Example 1. 
The following parameters are defined:  
 1 1 1 1= 20, =10, = 0.5, = 0.6, = 0.4f d p     
 
 2 2 2 2= 21, = 7, = 0.4, = 0.7f d p    
 
 3 3 3 3=15, = 5, = 0.5, = 0.8f d p    
Cost functions are given as:  
 21( ) =e e  
 22( ) =e e e   
 23( ) =e e e   
By using the above parameters we find that  
 21 1 1
1 3
( ) = ( ) ( ) =
2 4
e e e e    
 22
2
( ) = 0,89
3
e e e   
 23
2
( ) = 0,89
3
e e e   
 1
3
( ) =
2
e e  
 2( ) =1,78 0,67e e   
 3( ) =1,78 0,67e e   
 
Solution to the funds distribution problem in the complete information game 
 
Solution of the game with complete information leads to the following:  
 1 2 3
20
: = ( ) = =10, =11, = 7
2
f f f f fe e e e e    
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 1 2 3
10
: = ( ) = = 5, = 4, = 2
2
d d d d de e e e e     
 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3= 200, = 50, = 231, = 28, =105, =10f f d d f f d d f f d de e e e e e       
 
 1 2 31 2 3= ( ) =100, = ( ) =110, = ( ) = 56,f f f f f fs e s e s e    
 1 2 3
1 2 3= ( ) = 25, = ( ) =12, = ( ) = 6d d d d d ds e s e s e    
The equilibrium payoff of the principal agent gained from first broker is: 
1 1 10 = [ ]
F
H M e s   
1 10 1= [ ( ) ]
F F
H M e e H     
Similarly, from the second broker it is: 
2 2 20 = [ ]
F
H M e s   
2 20 2= [ ( ) ]
F F
H M e e H    
And from the third broker it is: 
3 3 30 = [ ]
F
H M e s   
3 30 3= [ ( ) ]
F F
H M e e H    
The optimal values are 
1
0
1 = 0,5(200 100) 0,5(50 25) = 62,5
F
optH     
2
0
1 = 0,4(231 110) 0,6(28 12) = 56,8
F
optH     
3
0
1 = 0,5(105 56) 0,5(10 6) = 26,5
F
optH     
 
Solution to the funds distribution problem in the game with information asymmetry.   
 
Let 
1
= 3FminH   
2
= 2FminH   
3
= 1FminH   
           4 4= ( ) ( ), =1,2,3
1
i
i
d i ii
p
e e i
p
   

 
1
410 = (2 1.5)e  
1
4 = 2,86e  
2
4 = 2,65e  
3
4 = 0,88e  
As expected 4 <
i i
de e  
1 1
4 = = 3
F F
minH H   
2 2
4 = = 2
F F
minH H   
3 3
4 = = 1
F F
minH H   
1 2
3
3ˆ = (2,86) 3 = 6,12 3
4
FH    
1
3
ˆ = 3,13FH  
2
3
ˆ = 3,41FH  
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3
3
ˆ = 0,27FH  
The payoff of the principal agent under condition of asymmetrical information becomes:  
1
0
2 = 0,5(100 3,13) 0,5(28,6 8,18 3) = 60,14
F
optH      
2
0
2 = 0,4(231 110 3,41) 0,6(7 2,65 4,37 2) = 56,7
F
optH        
3
0
2 = 0,5(105 56 0,27) 0,5(5 0,88 1.65 1) = 26,2
F
optH        
1 1
0 0
1 2 = 62,5 60,14 = 2,36
F F
opt optH H   
2 2
0 0
1 2 = 56,8 56,7 = 0,1
F F
opt optH H   
3 3
0 0
1 2 = 26,5 26,2 = 0,3
F F
opt optH H   
 
Solution to the principal agent`s funds distribution problem with a corrupted intermediary 
and under the influence of external limitations.  
 
Consider a situation when planning of funds distribution is under the influence of external 
limitations.  
First we find an optimal change in the production plan under unfavourable market 
conditions. 
4 4 4
ˆ : = ( ) (1 (1 )) ( ), =1,2,3
1 1
i i
i i i i
d i ii i
p
e e e i
p

  

    
 
 
1
4
3
10 = (2 (1 1,5 0,6) )
2
e    
2
48 = 4,85 1,072e   
3
45 = 6,63 2,74e   
1 1
4 4
ˆ = 2,06 < 2.86 =e e  
2 2
4 4
ˆ =1,87 < 2.65 =e e  
3 3
4 4
ˆ = 0,34 < 0,88 =e e  
As expected, the contract drawn up for the unfavourable market conditions in case of 
information asymmetry, is inevitably more skewed.   
Calculate the values of the necessary legal funds transfers needed to prevent the contract 
from corruption. 
1 2
1
3
= 0,6( 3 (2,06) )
4
s    
1
1 = 0,11s  
2
1 = 0,66s  
3
1 = 0,19s  
1
2 = 0.6 3 =1,8s   
2
2 =1,2s  
3
2 = 0,6s  
The principal agent`s payoff with the external limitations taken into account becomes: 
1 1 *0 0
1 1 2 4 4 4
ˆ ˆ ˆ= [ ( (1 ) )] (1 )[ ( ( ) ( ( ))) (1 )( ( ) )]
F F F F
lim opt f f min d minH H ps p s p e e H e p e e H                
 
1
0 = 0,6(62,5 0,5 1,91) 0,4[0,5(100 0,18) 0,5(20,6 4,24 3)]
F
limH         
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1
0 = 60,76
F
limH  
2
0 = 57,3
F
limH  
3
0 = 26,31
F
limH  
For all three producers 0 0 2>
F i F i
lim optH H  
It is in this case when it is advised to use the intermediary, and net payoff becomes:  
 
1 1
0 0
2 = 60,76 60,14 = 0,63
F F
lim optH H   
 
2 2
0 0
2 = 57,3 56,7 = 0,6
F F
lim optH H   
 
3 3
0 0
2 = 26,31 26,2 = 0,11
F F
lim optH H   
Based on the derived results, it is more favourable for the principal agent to make a contract with 
the third producer and the intermediary, and to also make legal fund transfers, which will exclude 
the corruption. But if the principal agent is forced to deal with all three producers (to avoid 
bankruptcy of either of them), then the principal agent gives the smallest possible sum of money to 
the producer with the lower expected payoff 
Example 2. 
 
Assume that the principal agent chooses to exclude the possibility of blackmail (in situation 
when the bargaining power of the intermediary is significantly bigger than the one of the producer). 
For example, the intermediary makes an offer  <<take-it-or-leave-it>>. Let us consider example 
based on only one producer (taking parameters from Example 1). 
First we need to find an optimal change in the production plan under unfavourable market 
conditions 14eˆ , which is same as in Example 1: 
1 1
4 4
ˆ = 2,06 < 2.86 =e e  
Now calculate the values of the legal fund transfers needed to prevent the contract from 
corruption. 
1 2
1
3
= 0,6( (2,06) )
4
s  
1
1 =1.91s  
The optimal principal agent payoff with the external limitations taken into account, 
becomes: 
1 1
0 0
1 1 4 4 4
ˆ ˆ ˆ= [ (1 )[ ( ( ) ( )) (1 )( ( ))]
F F
lim opt f f f dH H ps p e e e p e e              
1
0 = 0,6(62,5 0,5 1,91) 0,4[0,5(100 1.91) 0,5(20,6 4,24)] = 59,81
F
limH        
1 1
0 0
2<
F F
lim optH H  
In this situation, the principal agent should not use the intermediary.  
 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
The president of Russian Federation has set a very important task for Russia to enter into the 
top twenty countries in the «Doing business» ranking provided by the World Bank by 2018. As 
currently analysis of corruption practices and methods of anti-corruption activities are not well 
documented, all government proposed solutions did not prove to be effective. The paper presents 
formalisation of modelling process, analysis and mathematical description of corruption problem 
16 
 
when entering into a contract between principal agent and producers. 
It is suggested to carry out further research focusing on building real models for specific 
projects.  
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